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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                          
No. 06-3796
____________
THERESA HOOVER,
Appellant
vs.
JEFFREY A. BEARD, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;  DENNIS
R. ERHARD, Regional Deputy Secretary, Bureau of Inmate Services; DONALD
VAUGHN, Superintendent; BUZZARD, Mayor; SMITH, Captain; RAYMOND
KNAUER, Lieutenant; FRAZELL, Lieutenant; PALETE, Corrections Officer; MORO,
Corrections Officer; JOHN DOE, Corrections Officer; JULIE KNAUER, Director of
Nursing
____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-01529 ) 
District Judge:   Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 18, 2007
Before:   SLOVITER, SMITH and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:   September 21, 2007)
____________
OPINION 
                              
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Theresa Hoover, a nurse at the Pennsylvania State Correctional
1  Hoover initially sued several other individuals associated with the
Department of Corrections.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of all
of the defendants, but Hoover only appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Knauer.
2
Institution at Graterford (“SCI-Graterford”), was assaulted by an inmate who had
previously sexually harassed her while she was working in the prison’s Restricted
Housing Unit (“RHU”).  She brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a state-
created danger theory against Julie Knauer, the supervisor who assigned her to the RHU.1 
Because Knauer did not engage in conscience shocking behavior that would give rise to a
state-created danger claim, we will affirm the judgment in her favor.
Hoover worked as a nurse at SCI-Graterford beginning in 2000.  In August
2001, Irwin Brentley, an inmate, began sexually harassing her.  After Hoover reported the
inmate for misconduct, prison officials moved him to the RHU.
The inmate continued to harass and threaten Hoover.  In October, she
reported an incident to the head of internal security, who said that he would put in a
separation request.  The inmate was moved to a more restrictive block of the RHU after a
November 19 incident when he again threatened Hoover. 
Plaintiff continued to work in the RHU delivering medications every other
weekend.  She did not ask to be removed from that assignment.  The prison submitted a
request for a separation order on November 21 and it was approved on November 26. 
Neither Hoover nor any prison officials knew that the request had been approved before
Hoover was assaulted.  Nor is there evidence in the record that Hoover or the prison
3officials inquired about the status of the request prior to the assault.  
On December 16, 2001, Hoover was assigned to work both her regular shift
and an overtime shift in the general population blocks.  Toward the end of the first shift,
the nurse who had been assigned to cover the RHU during the second shift called in sick
and defendant, Julie Knauer, instructed Hoover’s supervisor to assign Hoover to cover the
shift. 
While covering the RHU shift, plaintiff encountered Brentley as he was
being escorted to his cell in handcuffs by corrections officers.  Brentley managed to break
free from the officers and charged at Hoover and struck her several times before the
officers were able to subdue him.  This attack left Hoover with several minor injuries, the
most severe of which was a laceration behind her ear that required nine stitches.
To establish a claim under the “state-created danger" doctrine, a plaintiff
must show, inter alia, that “a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the
conscience.”  Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted).  See also Bennett v.  City of Philadelphia, ____ F.3d ____, 2007 WL
2377601, at *5 (3d Cir. 2007).  Whether a state actor’s behavior shocks the conscience
“will depend upon the circumstances of each case, particularly the extent to which
deliberation is possible.”  Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2006).  
In “hyperpressurized” environments, “an intent to cause harm is usually
4required.” Id. at 309.  In cases, however, where “deliberation is possible and officials
have the time to make ‘unhurried judgments,’ deliberate indifference is sufficient” to
show conscience shocking behavior.  Id.  In between these two extremes, there are cases
in which a state actor is confronted with making “something less urgent than a ‘split-
second’ decision but more urgent than an ‘unhurried judgment.’”  Id. at 310.  In such
circumstances where a state actor must act with “hurried deliberation” to reach a decision
in “a matter of hours or minutes,” a plaintiff must show that a defendant “consciously
disregarded a great risk of harm.”  Id.  The District Court appropriately applied this
standard here, where Knauer had to act within a matter of hours to fill the position in the
RHU.  
Even if the appropriate standard here was deliberate indifference,  the
District Court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Knauer.  Hoover
was assigned to a cell block where she had a regular shift every other weekend.  She did
not object to the assignment at issue here and stated that she thought the cell block was
secure.  Thus, plaintiff has not shown that the defendant’s actions shocked the conscience. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
